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Abstract 
 
The trading of private securities has recently gained greater visibility and importance with the advent of 
organized, private security exchanges.  This paper uses data on IPO firms that list on the SharesPost 
private securities exchange platform to examine the potential benefits of a listing.  Specifically, we test 
whether a listing reduces IPO underpricing or enables liquidity provision to firm employees.  Controlling 
for endogeneity, we find no evidence that a pre-IPO listing on SharesPost lessens IPO underpricing.  
However, we also find that SharesPost-listed companies are able to pay their employees less in cash and 
more in stock and stock options than comparable non-SharesPost companies.  Further, executive officers 
in SharesPost-listed IPO companies sell less shares during the IPO.  These findings suggest that liquidity 
provision via the SharesPost platform significantly influences the form of compensation paid to 
employees before IPO and reduces the amount of capital raised in a funding event that must be allocated 
to meet employee needs.   
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1. Introduction 
The average length of time for a venture capital-backed start-up to go from founding to initial public 
offering (IPO) is now roughly 10 years, more than double the four year average a decade ago.1  Difficult 
economic conditions following the financial crisis and fallout from the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 
2000 combined to produce a dramatic decrease in IPOs in markets around the world.2  In turn, the 
collapse of IPO markets made it difficult for risk and venture capital (VC) providers to exit their 
investments.  For the larger, more established private companies still in demand in the IPO market, new 
problems emerged after the 2008 crises: the regulation of financial institutions intensified.  To comply 
with these enhanced regulations, financial institutions introduced various risk-mitigation measures that 
made IPOs more complex and expensive.  
Challenged by these new circumstances, the private equity industry devised alternative methods 
to finance private firms.  Many new platforms, such as crowdfunding and peer-to-peer business lending, 
entered the arena in conjunction with several new entrepreneurial financing instruments, such as equity-
like mezzanine, reward, and donation-based financing.  The platform that we focus on in this paper, the 
SharesPost secondary market, belongs to this group of new initiatives within the private equity market 
that blur the stark distinction between public and private equity markets.  Specifically, we examine 
whether the SharesPost secondary market aids private firms in the pricing-setting process as they 
transition from private to public markets during IPO and whether the SharesPost market provides 
liquidity to management and directors of these private firms during the now-prolonged period before 
they go public.   
The primary function of the private secondary market is to mitigate the negative effects private 
firms experience when they do not have access to the public capital markets.  The SharesPost platform, 
as a financial intermediary in the private market, may partially fill the pre-IPO investment banking role 
of gathering information and assessing market demand in order to set an appropriate IPO offer price.  
Given the sizable volume of some recent private issues, we expect that market transaction data such as 
trading volume, indications of interest and realized sales price will reduce information asymmetries. 
Despite evidence that underwriters utilize transaction data from the private markets to aid in the 
setting of IPO offering prices,3 several other characteristics of the private markets raise questions about 
the informativeness of private market transaction prices.  First, because many of the shares sold in private 
markets such as SharesPost and SecondMarket are restricted private securities, issuers are not required to 
disclose financial information about the firm.  Thus, it is not evident, ex-ante, what information is 
incorporated in prices.  Second, because of sales restrictions, many private market shares have limited 
liquidity, further inhibiting the informativeness of the contracted sales price.  Cole, et al. (2016, page 1), 
however, find that pre-IPO trading in the OTC market lowers IPO underpricing, despite “important 
limitations, such as low liquidity, high volatility, lack of analyst following, and high fraud levels, that allow 
uncertainty to remain high.” Since the nature of private market platforms like OTC and SharesPost varies, 
the question of whether information asymmetry is reduced by trading in the private secondary markets 
during the pre-IPO period remains.  We address this question in this study.   
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Mendoza and Vermeulen, 2011; Tortoise & Hare Revisited: "Time To IPO" For VC-Backed Startups, Forbes, February 24, 
2015; But When Will They Go Public? A Profile of the Average Company at IPO, Equityzen.com, August 13, 2015. 
2 Consider, for example, Germany, where the Neuer Markt (the stock market segment for high tech and innovative ventures) closed down 
in 2001 (Vismara et al. 2012). 
3 Zynga, Inc. notes in its 2011 S-1 registration statement that transactions in the private secondary market are the “primary basis for 
determining the fair value of our common and… preferred stock” (page 66).  Jive Software incorporated volume and pricing data from 
“(an) increased number of (private) secondary transactions in our common stock” during the pricing of its IPO (2011 S-1 registration 
statement, page 62).   
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 The lengthening of the start-up lifecycle has consequences for start-up firms, their employees and 
the institutions that fund them.  Firm employees are now forced to hold illiquid stock options and stock 
grants for a much longer period until the firm IPO that allows them to cash-in.  For firm management, 
providing near-term liquidity for employee stock compensation is a feature that enables them to attract, 
retain and ensure the commitment of the top-flight talent that fuels revolutionary new ideas and growth. 
Extending the time to IPO thus affects employee compensation and retention.  Buy-side investors have 
a similar problem.  Those who missed early investment opportunities in promising new firms would 
prefer to invest pre-IPO rather than wait until shares hit the public market because skyrocketing 
valuations for late-stage start-ups limit future returns.  
These needs, among others, have helped fuel the recent popularity of the private secondary 
market.  New intermediaries such as Nasdaq Private Market, SharesPost and SecondMarket have, by 
leveraging electronic market platforms that allow for standardization, efficiency and lower transaction 
costs, largely replaced the old ad-hoc services traditionally offered by brokerage firms.  As a result, the 
volume of annual secondary market transaction has increased from roughly $10 billion in 2009 to over 
$40 billion in 2014 (J.P. Morgan, 2015).  Figure 1 presents annual secondary deal volume from 2009 to 
2015.     
 
Figure 1: Annual secondary transaction volume  
This figure presents annual secondary private equity transaction volume, in US $, billions.  Data is 
compiled from reporting by Cogent, UBS and J.P. Morgan Asset Management.  2015 annual data is 
estimated by annualizing 2015 first half volume as reported by intermediary firm Setter Capital and Dow 
Jones & Co., Inc.    
 
 
Despite the rapidly growing size of the U.S. private secondary market, there is very little in the 
way of rigorous academic study of the U.S. market and its effects. Our empirical study aims to contribute 
to the literature in three ways.  First, we provide a depiction of this rapidly evolving industry.  Second, 
using data from the SharesPost private secondary market platform, we test whether a firm’s listing on 
SharesPost prior to an IPO reduces information asymmetry and resulting underpricing during the IPO.  
Third, we use data gathered from SEC documents for IPO firms listed on SharesPost to test whether a 
pre-IPO SharesPost listing provides liquidity to firm employees. 
This study contributes to several strands of literature, including the extensive literature on IPOs 
and information asymmetry.  We examine the effects of pre-IPO trading in the private securities market 
on IPO underpricing and initially find that IPO underpricing, and post-IPO return volatility, of 
SharesPost-listed firms is greater than that of non-SharesPost-listed firms.  However, after controlling 
for firm and IPO characteristics we find that a SharesPost listing has a statistically insignificant effect on 
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IPO underpricing.  This finding is robust to i) controlling for the endogeneity of the SharesPost listing 
choice and ii) the reduction of bias from confounding factors using a matching technique.  This finding 
is inconsistent with the evidence that pre-IPO trading in the OTC market reduces IPO underpricing 
(Cole, et al., 2016) and that pre-IPO prices in the AIM and Taiwanese markets are informative about 
post-IPO prices (Derrien and Kecskés, 2007; Chang, et al., 2017).  Because SharesPost-listed IPO firms 
are predominately highly-visible technology firms who receive much press and investor attention, the 
additional information provided by private trading on SharesPost appears to provide little in the way of 
additional information to attenuate uncertainty during the IPO process. 
  We also highlight another important aspect of SharesPost secondary markets, which is to 
provide liquidity to several sets of stakeholders.  We find that SharesPost-listed private firms are able to 
pay their employees less in cash, and more in stock and stock options, than non-SharesPost companies.  
SharesPost-listed firms pay 54% of total executive compensation in stock in the year before IPO, on 
average.  This percentage is significantly higher than the 35% average for a matched sample of comparable 
firms that do not list on SharesPost.  This finding is robust to compensation, industry, firm and financing 
characteristics.  Furthermore, we find that a listing on SharesPost has a negative and significant effect on 
the percent of founder, executive officer and director shares offered in an IPO.  This result is robust to 
industry, firm and financing characteristics and suggests that the enhanced liquidity from the SharesPost 
platform reduces the proportion of raised capital that must be allocated to meet employee sales, which 
allows more of the total proceeds to go toward funding company growth.  Given the recent emergence 
of private markets and the availability of historical data, we highlight this as a promising area for future 
research. 
   The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant literature 
that informs the hypothesis development.  Section 3 outlines recent developments in the secondary 
private securities and depicts the current state of the market.  Section 4 describes the data.  Section 5 
presents and interprets test results on the effects of a SharesPost listing on IPO underpricing, while 
Section 6 does the same for employee compensation.  Section 7 provides concluding remarks.  
 
2.  Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1  Information asymmetry and IPO underpricing   
Financial intermediaries help overcome the informational frictions in a market-based economy.  Leland 
and Pyle (1977) suggest that information asymmetry is the essential reason for the existence of financial 
intermediaries and that information sharing needs lead financial intermediation.  Firms employ financial 
intermediaries during security offerings to reduce informational frictions with investors by enabling a 
credible third party (the intermediary) to produce information (see, e.g., Titman and Trueman, 1986; 
Carter and Manaster, 1990; Ljungqvist, 2007).  Taken together, the evidence in these studies highlight the 
importance of using a third party as a tool to mitigate informational problems. 
One of the biggest challenges for a buyer investing in a private company is the lack of credible 
information.  Private companies are highly opaque with a correspondingly high cost of gathering 
information (Lerner and Schoar, 2004; Sahlman, 1990).  Under these circumstances, financial 
intermediaries (such as private equity firms) typically step in to fill the need for capital by investing in 
these companies through buyouts, growth capital or venture capital.  Private equity firms provide capital, 
as well as business and managerial expertise, to these early-stage companies (Lerner, 1995) and, at the 
same time, facilitate the provision of credible information to investors, thus reducing information 
asymmetry between companies and investors (Amit, et al., 1998).  It is through this monitoring and 
certification role that intermediaries increase the likelihood that investors may successfully exit a private 
company investment through initial public offering (IPO) or acquisition (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; 
Barry, et al., 1990).   
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Further complicating the process is the fact that private firms are often reluctant to reveal a great 
deal of information, especially if the business is heavily invested in a technological advancement that has 
proprietary value.  For this reason, some private equity firms are reluctant to enter the public equity 
markets, given the high disclosure requirements (Spiegel and Tookes, 2008).  According to Spiegel and 
Tookes (2008), larger, more profitable firms with small rivals, in particular, have the greatest incentives 
to innovate and, thus, shy away from the public markets in order to keep information private.  Following 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank act, the IPO process now requires even greater revelation of even more 
information. These requirements likely contribute to decisions by successful private firms such as Uber 
and Airbnb to stay private for a longer time period despite apparently high demand in the IPO market.  
Under these circumstances, financial innovations such as SharesPost are bridging the gap to support 
private firms during this time of transition in the IPO market.  
 We hypothesize that the SharesPost platform may act as a financial intermediary prior to IPO 
date, partially filling the role of an investment bank who assesses market demand in order to set an 
appropriate price per share for the IPO, without incurring the actual costs of a going public transaction.  
A platform such as SharesPost gives smaller investors the opportunity to invest in private equity by 
purchasing shares of private companies.  For these smaller investors, this means greater liquidity, 
accessibility and the opportunity to buy private companies without a large capital commitment (Brown 
and Kraeussl, 2012).  For shareholders in the listed firm, such as employees and private equity investors, 
this means greater available liquidity by selling shares on SharesPost.  In this way, a listing on SharesPost 
may boost the company’s long term prospects, as the existence of such a preliminary platform for 
exchange may reduce information asymmetry and thus make the IPO transaction smoother, on the 
margin, as compared to a similar private company not listed on SharesPost.  
However, relatively little research focuses on the effects of trading in the U.S. private securities 
markets.  Cole, et al. (2016) examine IPO underpricing for firms that list first on the OTC market before 
listing on a national exchange where  IPO’s are normally executed4.  They find that these firms experience 
a reduction in uncertainty during pre-IPO trading, lower IPO underpricing and lower post-IPO return 
volatility.  Chang, et al. (2017) study Taiwan’s mandatory pre-IPO market and find that, despite the 
informativeness of pre-IPO prices on the exchange, IPO underpricing remains high – first day returns 
average 55%.  They conclude that agency problems, not asymmetric information, are the cause of such 
levels of underpricing.  They also note that government restrictions on IPO pricing have since reduced 
the average first day return to 27%.  Studies of pre-IPO European trading markets such as AIM in the 
U.K. (Derrien and Kecskés, 2007), and grey market trading in Europe (Cornelli, et al., 2006; Aussenegg, 
et al., 2006) indicate that pre-IPO prices may be informative about post-IPO prices, but the evidence on 
underpricing is unclear. 
Further, Vismara, et al. (2012) show that most secondary markets in Europe fail.  They find that 
the long-run performance of second-market IPOs in Europe is poor relative to main market IPOs and 
that IPOs that list on second markets are more likely to be subsequently delisted or targeted by an 
acquiring firm.  However, London’s AIM market, which has less stringent listing requirements than other 
secondary markets, is an exception.  The authors argue that the success of the AIM market might be 
attributable to its low cost of entry and less stringent information requirements.  In a similar study, Meoli 
et al., (2016) examine the effectiveness of the junior public equity markets in readying growth-oriented 
firms for the senior equity markets. Specifically, they examine the performance of firms that graduate 
from the Toronto Venture Stock Exchange (TSX-V) to the senior Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), and 
compare the post-graduation performance against the performance of VC-backed firms that directly have 
                                                 
4 Although a formal definition of “OTC market” is not provided in the study, the exchanges SharesPost and SecondMarket are not 
referenced in the paper and the context of the analysis leads to the reasonable assumption that the OTC markets analyzed are the public 
OTC markets OTCQX, OTCQB and OTC Pink marketplaces (previously the OTC Bulletin Board and Pink Sheets). 
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an IPO on the TSX.   They find that TSX-V graduations on average significantly outperform VC-backed 
IPOs by 28.2 percentage points in the three years following the TSX listing.   
An important distinction between the North American and European markets is that the TSX-V 
is a sequential segmentation market.  While the TSX-V has modified listing and governance requirements 
as compared to the TSX, TSX-V IPOs are approved by the same securities regulators as senior market 
IPOs and are brought to market by the same underwriters.  Meoli et al., (2016) assert that the sequential 
segmentation model may provide an opportunity for junior public firms to seamlessly transition to a 
senior stock market.  We argue that SharesPost may have a similar effect, thus making the transition to 
public markets more seamless. 
Collectively, the IPO literature shows that IPOs are underpriced, on average; the typical issue 
experiences a significant increase from the offer price to the closing price on the first day of trading (see, 
e.g., Stoll and Curley, 1970; Ibbotson 1975; and Ritter and Welch, 2002).5  This phenomena is subject to 
considerable temporal variation, however.  Underpricing averaged 18.8% from 1980 to 2001, with a high 
of 65% during the dot.com boom years 1999 to 2000, but only 7.4% during the 1980’s (Ritter and Welch, 
2002).  The IPO literature also establishes that the cross-sectional variation in first day IPO returns is 
higher in the presence of greater information asymmetry (see, e.g., Ritter, 1984 and Lowry, et al., 2010). 
We use IPO underpricing as a proxy for information asymmetry during the IPO pricing process.  
If IPO underpricing is caused by information asymmetry, then activity that provides information about 
a firm’s future prospects, investor demand for firm stock, or market price of the stock should reduce the 
level of IPO underpricing.  We test the hypothesis that pre-IPO trading on the SharesPost platform 
reduces information asymmetry for SharesPost-listed firms which, in turn, reduces IPO underpricing. 
A testable prediction of the asymmetrical information reduction hypothesis, as synthesized from the 
discussion above, is as follows:  
H1: IPO firms who experience pre-IPO trading from a listing on SharesPost experience lower information 
asymmetry and thus, lower IPO underpricing 
2.2  Employee compensation and liquidity risk 
A challenge facing investors in the market for private companies is the need for substantial, long-term 
capital commitments.  Investments in private companies are typically highly illiquid with an average 
duration of 8 to 10 years.  As a result, institutional investors are generally the investor type best able to 
consistently commit capital to such long term, illiquid assets.  Institutional investors typically invest in 
private start-ups through the use of limited partnership funds managed by a VC general partner.  VC 
funds generate return through capital gains in exit transactions; IPO exits are the preferred exit route as 
they typically provide VCs with the greatest returns and reputational benefits (see, e.g., Gompers, 1996 
and Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2001).  One of the biggest risks a VC takes on during the start-up lifecycle 
is liquidity risk.  Cumming, et al. (2005) define liquidity risk in this context as the risk of not being able 
to effectively exit and thus being forced either to remain much longer in the venture or to sell the shares 
at a high discount. 
In a similar manner, managers of start-up firms are subject to a type of liquidity risk.  Meulbroek 
(2001) notes that managers of young, private growth companies typically have a large fraction of personal 
wealth tied up in firm stock.  Furthermore, these managers hold firm stock in portfolios that are 
undiversified.  Managers thus have an incentive to diversify their portfolio by selling firm stock but are 
constrained by the availability of liquidity events in much the same way VC firms are.  If the lengthening 
of the start-up cycle increases liquidity risk then mechanisms that provide liquidity in the private market 
pre-IPO, such as private secondary marketplaces like SharesPost, should decrease liquidity risk by 
                                                 
5 The literature uses first day returns as a measure of IPO underpricing. 
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blurring the distinction between public and private equity markets.  Ibrahim (2012) models the benefits 
of increased liquidity in the private secondary market.   
According to agency theory, there is a tradeoff between incentive compensation and risk.  Since 
agents need to be compensated for greater risk through higher wages, the firms need to trade off 
incentive-based compensation against higher wage costs.  Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Jin (2002) 
find empirical results supporting this argument. They find that pay-performance sensitivity is decreasing 
with risk.  There are several possible reasons why the agent may discount stock compensation overall 
under a high risk setting, especially in more established private companies that are traded on SharesPost.  
First, agents in private companies are typically undiversified with a significant portion of their wealth tied 
up in company stock.  This causes the executive to discount the value of the stock based compensation 
even more (Core et al., 1999; Meulbroek, 2001; Jin, 2002).   
Second, the executives will want to diversify their portfolio by selling shares or exercising stock 
options.  This will decrease the incentive alignment goal and also send a negative signal to the markets 
regarding the value of the firm (Meulbroek, 2001).  Considering these factors, and consistent with the 
trade-off of risk and incentives in the traditional agency model, we argue that for the private companies 
in our SharesPost sample, incentive-based compensation should increase with decreases in liquidity risk. 
For that reason, we argue that companies that are listed on SharesPost will be able to offer its employees 
more stock based compensation and that the employees will hold onto their shares more during the IPO 
given the reduction in liquidity risk and their resulting ability to more easily sell shares pre-IPO. 
 We use data on executive compensation from SharesPost-listed companies to test the hypothesis 
that a listing on the SharesPost platform reduces liquidity risk.  We hypothesize that companies that list 
on SharesPost will be able to offer their employees more stock-based compensation and that the 
employees will sell less shares during the IPO due to the pre-IPO liquidity provided by SharesPost. 
A testable prediction of the increased liquidity hypothesis, as synthesized from the discussion above, 
is as follows:  
H2: IPO firms who experience pre-IPO trading from a listing on SharesPost experience greater liquidity and thus, 
pay their employees more in stock and stock options. 
H3: IPO firms who experience pre-IPO trading from a listing on SharesPost experience greater liquidity and thus, 
rely less on IPOs to provide liquidity to their employees. 
 
3. Evolution of the private securities market 
Today’s private secondary marketplace looks little like the obscure institutional market of two decades 
ago.  That market was characterized by very low volume, high transaction costs and almost exclusively 
institutional participants dealing in distressed assets (Mendoza and Vermeulen, 2011).  Today’s market 
consists of multiple electronic platforms, comparatively high volume, (relatively more) standardized 
execution, lower transaction costs and a participant base made up, increasingly, of individual investors.   
The secondary market for private securities is, in effect, two distinct markets.  The “fund market” 
is the market for limited partnership (LP) interests in VC funds.  The “direct market” is the market for 
the stock of (private) start-ups.   Although related, the two markets did not develop synchronously.  This 
section reviews the evolution of the marketplace and describes the state of the market as of the drafting 
of this manuscript. 
3.1 The fund market 
The fund market originated over 25 years ago when the first private equity funds were raised to purchase 
limited partnership interests in VC funds (Ibrahim, 2012).  The first dedicated electronic platform for the 
fund market was introduced shortly thereafter when Nasdaq launched the PORTAL system in 1990 to 
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facilitate trade in restricted private securities by qualified institutional buyers, as permitted under Rule 
144a that regulates private placements.  The market continued to grow during the 1990’s dot.com era as 
more players entered the picture.  NYPPEX, formed in 1998, was one of the first private market 
intermediaries dedicated to providing liquidity to the private secondary market; it now hosts over $10 
billion in secondary private equity interests (Birdthistle and Henderson, 2009).   
Today, the fund market consists of a multitude of investment funds dedicated to purchasing LP 
interests in venture capital, private equity, hedge funds and other illiquid interests.  Investors sell primarily 
for idiosyncratic liquidity reasons or to rebalance their portfolios while purchasers are typically motivated 
by the steep discounts available on the LP’s portfolio of uncertain private investments. 
3.2 The direct market 
The direct market for private firm shares arose as a means of providing liquidity after the dot.com bust 
left many saddled with e-commerce stocks no longer tradable on public exchanges (Burstein and 
Schwerin, 2008).  In its infancy, the market consisted of one-off transactions; shareholders either sought 
out funds dedicated to purchasing private secondary interests or those funds attempted to identify firm 
employees or shareholders willing to sell.  Search, information and transaction costs were understandably 
high.   
As the volume and value of such deals increased, a new type of player entered the direct market.  
In 2009, SecondMarket and SharesPost began operation as intermediaries offering to facilitate 
transactions through their respective electronic marketplaces.  Both firms offered features akin to a true 
marketplace.  They i) attracted both buyers and sellers to a central location, ii) facilitated price discovery 
through quoted bid and offer information, and iii) reduced transaction costs by offering standardized 
sales contracts as well as streamlined escrow services (Ibrahim, 2012).  Volume in high-profile firms such 
as Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter spiked.6  SharesPost reported an estimated $2 billion in direct share 
trades from 2009 to 2014; SecondMarket reported $1.5 billion in 2013 alone.7 8 Nasdaq entered the market 
with the launch of Nasdaq Private Market in 2014 as a joint venture with SharesPost. 
The growth of the direct market was driven primarily by two factors.  First, as discussed, the 
lengthening of the start-up lifecycle had forced investors in private firms to seek liquidity in the private 
secondary market rather than wait for the traditional IPO exit.  The “private IPO”, or late-stage growth 
funding, has effectively replaced the IPO as the preferred vehicle for financing large, mature private 
startups.  PitchBook estimates that the total value of “private IPO” rounds of $40 million and above were 
almost three times that of IPOs in 2014, and more than five times that of IPOs in the first half of 2015.9  
Second, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act that took effect in 2013 raised the maximum 
number of shareholders in a private company (excluding employees) from 500 to 2,000.  This allowed 
outside investors greater access to private companies and fed the increase in trade volume on private 
secondary exchanges.  
However, secondary sales create problems for the start-ups themselves because share sales to 
anonymous investors complicate a firm’s ownership structure.10  Pre-IPO share sales increase 
administrative costs, expose the firm to potential legal issues and create demand from new investors for 
information that private companies may not be willing to share.  In response, private companies took 
                                                 
6 Private Share Trading Takes off as Tech Companies Shun IPOs, Financial Times, June 2, 2015. 
7 SecondMarket Sets up Transfer Facilities for Startups to Manage Secondary Sales, TechCrunch.com, April 14, 2015. 
8 Private Share Trading Takes off as Tech Companies Shun IPOs, Financial Times, June 2, 2015. 
9 The Emergence of the “Private IPO”, PitchBook.com, August 5, 2015. 
10 Once a sale is effected, outside investors become part of the capitalization table which records the ownership percentages of founders 
and investors through various rounds of financing.  Thus, higher shareholder turnover becomes an increasingly burdensome and costly 
legal process for these private companies to manage.   
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steps to control the sale of their shares.  Many increasingly exercised their right of first refusal11 and 
utilized very strict no-transfer clauses.12   
Today, the direct market operates in a more orderly, structured fashion and oftentimes at the 
direction of the listed companies themselves.  Formal company-sponsored tender offers now make up 
the bulk of secondary direct sales.  These programs allow companies to control the type of buyers who 
acquire ownership interest; potential investors are typically mutual funds, VC funds and private equity 
funds who missed out during primary rounds.  Employees sell to these small pools of pre-selected 
investors at preset prices, allowing them to cash in on previously illiquid incentive compensation.  As a 
consequence, SecondMarket ceased direct share trading and focused exclusively on tender offers.  
SharesPost also shifted focus to tender offers but continued with direct share trading through the joint 
venture Nasdaq Private Market.  Nasdaq purchased SharesPost’s interest in Nasdaq Private Market in 
late 2015 and concurrently acquired SecondMarket, leaving SharesPost and Nasdaq Private Market as the 
two leading private secondary marketplaces. 
 
4.  Data sample and variable construction  
4.1  Sample and data construction 
The sample period used for this study includes the years 2009 to 2015.  We collect data on all firms that 
list on the SharesPost exchange prior to going public during the period 2009 to 2015; the initial sample 
totals 62 firms.  Identification of SharesPost-listed firms that subsequently listed via IPO was gathered 
through contact with representatives of the SharesPost exchange and through manual collection of data 
from the SharesPost website.13   
We use Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum IPO data to compile the initial sample of 1,548 non-
SharesPost IPO firms for the years 2009 to 2015.  We restrict both SharesPost and non-SharesPost firms 
to those firms contained in the CRSP monthly stock file; the CRSP file is comprised of publicly traded 
firms on the NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ stock exchanges.  We follow the IPO literature in applying 
the following data filters: we exclude all IPOs with an offer price less than $5; we retain only ordinary 
common shares of U.S. companies (CRSP share codes 10 and 11); we exclude IPOs in the financial 
services industry (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) and we exclude real estate investment trusts (REITs), closed-
end funds and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs).   
Variables based on balance sheet data are computed using data from the Compustat 
Fundamentals Quarterly file for the quarter immediately prior to the IPO date.  Data for firm age is 
compiled from Jay Ritter’s data on firm founding dates14 and augmented, where necessary, using data 
from firm SEC filings.  Average underwriter ranking and average monthly IPO returns is compiled from 
Jay Ritter’s IPO data.15  Data for IPO characteristics, securities exchange and VC funding is compiled 
from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum IPO database.  Applying these data restrictions reduces the 
initial sample of SharesPost firms from 62 to 55 firms and the initial sample of non-SharesPost firms to 
503 firms.  Data on firm sales and distance to SharesPost headquarters limits the non-SharesPost firm 
sample to 446 firms. 
                                                 
11 In general, a shareholder in a private firm must obtain management approval before he can sell shares in that firm; this right of first 
refusal (ROFR) allows companies to retain control over share sales.  Firm by-laws that govern a firm’s securities activity may include 
prohibitions on stock option transfers, prohibitions on transfer of unvested stock shares, the right of first refusal on vested shares, 
required approval by the board of directors of all share sales, or the enforcement of new share restrictions on any share purchases (Belt et 
al., 2014).  
12 Private Share Trading Takes off as Tech Companies Shun IPOs, Financial Times, June 2, 2015. 
13 https://sharespost.com 
14 http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm 
15 https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ 
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4.2  Variable construction 
Definitions for all variable are presented in Table 1.  Our measures of IPO underpricing, compensation 
and compensation liquidity are: 
• First day return: logarithm of the percent change from the offer price to the closing price on the first 
day of trading (i.e., day of offer).    
• 21 day return: logarithm of the percent change from the offer price to the closing price on the twenty-
first day of trading.  Lowry, et al. (2010) use this as an alternate measure of underpricing in order to 
avoid distortions from underwriter price support. 
• Stock Compensation (%): ratio of stock-based compensation (stock grants and stock options) to total 
compensation.    
• Shares offered in IPO (%) Number of shares offered / total shares owned prior to offering. 
Some of our primary measures of IPO, compensation, financing and firm characteristics are as 
follows: 
• IPO, # of shares (log):  Lowry, et al. (2010) argue that smaller issues have greater asymmetric information 
and, thus, greater underpricing, on average. 
• Underwriter rank (average): Highly ranked underwriters may be able to price the issue more accurately, 
thus reducing underpricing.  Alternatively, highly ranked underwriters may lead to greater 
underpricing as issuers pay for coverage by the more prestigious analysts employed by the highly 
ranked underwriters by accepting greater underpricing (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). 
• Offer price revision: Butler, et al. (2014), in a comprehensive examination of the IPO literature, find that 
offer price revision is a significant predictor of initial IPO returns.  
• Firm age as of IPO date (log): an alternate measure of risk because the future returns of younger firms 
tend to be less certain than those of large firms, all else equal. 
• Firm cash flow: an alternate measure of risk because firms that experience decreases in cash flow, and 
lower levels of cash flow, tend to have more uncertain future prospects.  The level of firm cash flow 
will likely also influence the medium of employee compensation for the small, private companies in 
the sample; decreases in firm cash flow should increase the level of stock compensation.  
• Firm debt: a measure of financial leverage that proxies for firm risk. 
• Intangible assets: an alternative measure of firm risk. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables used in regression analysis.  
 
5.  The influence of SharesPost listing on IPO returns 
5.1  IPO returns and characteristics 
If, as hypothesized, pre-IPO trading of SharesPost-listed firms lessens firm information asymmetry then 
we should expect initial returns of IPOs for these firms to be lower, on average, than for firms who do 
not list on SharesPost.  Table 3 reports the results of univariate tests of IPO returns and variables used 
to explain IPO returns.   
SharesPost-listed firms have a median first day (21 day) return of about 33% (25%) while all other 
IPO firms have a median return of about 8.75% (14.4%).  The difference in mean returns are significant 
at the .01% (5%) level.  SharesPost firms offer more shares in the IPO (although the difference is not 
statistically significant), and have significantly greater IPO proceeds than other firms, on average.  
Furthermore, SharesPost firms experience positive offer price revision, on average, during the IPO 
pricing process while all other firms experience negative offer price revision, on average.  The difference  
11 
 
Table 1: Variable definitions 
This table defines the variables used in our analyses and identifies the source of the data used to calculate the variables.   
                                                 
16 https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ 
17 https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ 
18 http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm 
 
Variable Definition Source 
   First day return Logarithm of the percent change from the offer price to the 
closing price on the first day of trading (i.e., day of offer).   
Calculated,  CRSP 
21 day return Logarithm of the percent change from the offer price to the 
closing price on the twenty-first day of trading  
Calculated,  CRSP 
Stock Compensation (%) (Stock grants + stock options) / (salary + bonus + stock 
grants + stock options + non-equity incentive compensation 
+ all other compensation).  Measured in dollars in the year 
prior to IPO.   
SEC form S-1 registration 
statement 
Non - Stock Compensation (%) (salary + bonus + non-equity incentive compensation + all 
other compensation ) / (salary + bonus + stock grants + 
stock options + non-equity incentive compensation + all 
other compensation).  Measured in dollars in the year prior 
to IPO.   
SEC form S-1 registration 
statement 
Shares offered in IPO (%) Number of shares offered / total shares owned prior to 
offering 
SEC form S-1 registration 
statement 
IPO, # of shares (log) Logarithm of the number of shares (in millions) offered in 
the IPO.   
Calculated,  CRSP 
Underwriter rank (average) Prestige of the underwriter(s) participating in the syndicate, 
as ranked by Carter and Manaster (1990) and Loughran and 
Ritter (2004).   
Jay Ritter’s IPO data16 
Offer price revision % change from the Original Middle of Filing Price Range to 
the eventual Offer Price used in the IPO.   
SDC Platinum IPO database 
Tech industry Binary variable equal to one if the IPO firm is in a high tech 
industry, zero otherwise.   High tech is defined as belonging 
to the biotech, computer equipment, communications, 
electronics and general technology industries (SIC codes 283, 
357, 366, 367, 382, 384, 481, 482, 489, 737, 873). 
SDC Platinum IPO database 
VC-backed Binary variable equal to one if the IPO firm received funding 
from a venture capital firm prior to the IPO, zero otherwise 
SDC Platinum IPO database 
Exchange Binary variable equal to one if the IPO is listed on the 
NASDAQ, and zero if the IPO is listed on the NYSE.   
SDC Platinum IPO database 
Previous month’s IPO return Average IPO (first day) return in the month prior to the IPO 
date  
Jay Ritter’s IPO data17 
CRSP EW return Average daily return for the CRSP equal weight index in the 
month prior to the IPO date   
Calculated,  CRSP 
CRSP EW st. dev. Standard deviation of average daily returns for the CRSP 
equal weight index in the month prior to the IPO date   
Calculated,  CRSP 
Firm age as of IPO date (log) Logarithm of 1 plus the number of years since the firm was 
founded, measured as of the date of the IPO 
Jay Ritter’s  data on firm 
founding dates18 
Number of venture financing rounds Total number of rounds of capital raised via venture capital 
firms, prior to IPO 
SDC Platinum IPO database 
Hot IPO indicator Binary variable equal to one if the IPO is during a period of 
very high initial returns in the IPO market, and zero if not.   
Lowry, et al. (2010) 
Firm sales (log) Logarithm of firm sales.  Measured quarterly. Calculated, compustat 
12 
 
 
in mean offer price revisions are significant at the .01% level.  The average fees paid by SharesPost firms 
to underwriters is no different than that of other firms.  However, the average prestige rank of the 
underwriters for SharesPost-listed firms is significantly higher than for other firms.  SharesPost firms are 
also significantly younger and have significantly lower sales, on average, at the time of the IPO.  The 
differences in total assets and cash flow are not statistically significant.    
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of explanatory variables 
This table presents summary statistics for the explanatory variables employed in regression analysis of IPO 
underpricing for the period from 2009 to 2015.  Variable definitions are presented in Table 1. 
Summary statistics Mean Median Min Max 
Standard  
deviation 
Obs. 
       
SharesPost indicator 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 446 
First day return (%) 19.08 11.26 -27.40 148.75 28.37 446 
21 day return (%) 21.61 15.72 -44.00 156.48 32.26 446 
Underwriter rank (average) 8.17 8.50 0.00 9.00 1.22 446 
IPO, # of shares (log) 16.06 15.89 13.59 19.99 0.81 446 
Offer price revision -1.32 0.00 -53.85 45.45 14.87 446 
Tech industry indicator 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 446 
VC - backed indicator 0.51 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 446 
Exchange indicator 0.53 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 446 
Previous month's IPO return (%) 16.23 15.10 -6.00 32.30 8.51 446 
CRSP EW return (%) 0.08 0.08 -0.47 1.09 0.16 446 
CRSP EW st. dev. (%) 0.80 0.73 0.37 2.79 0.35 446 
Total liabilities to assets 0.89 0.78 0.07 10.37 0.79 446 
Firm age a/o IPO date (log) 2.67 2.48 0.00 5.15 0.90 446 
Firm cash flow (%) -4.10 2.83 -99.00 67.97 25.83 446 
Firm sales (log) 3.61 3.65 2.21 -4.96 10.44 446 
Distance 1,433.03 1,637.62 0.38 3,631.80 1,022.68 446 
              
 
Table 4 reports the standard deviation of initial IPO returns.  The standard deviation of first day 
IPO returns for SharesPost listed firms is about 36% as compared to a standard deviation of about 28% 
for all other IPO firms.  Similarly, the standard deviation of 21 day initial IPO returns is about 39% for 
SharesPost listed firms, and about 35% for non-SharesPost IPO firms.  Given that the SharesPost-listed 
companies are from industries that typically have greater information asymmetries, these findings are 
consistent with evidence presented in Lowry, et al. (2010).  Lowry, et al. (2010) find that the volatility of 
Variable Definition Source 
Firm total assets (log) Logarithm of total assets.  Measured quarterly. Calculated, compustat 
Total liabilities to assets Total liabilities / total assets.  Measured quarterly. Calculated, compustat 
Firm cash flow Operating income before depreciation / total assets.  
Measured quarterly. 
Calculated, compustat 
Firm debt (Current debt + long term debt) / total assets.  Measured 
quarterly. 
Calculated, compustat 
Intangible assets Intangible assets / total assets.  Measured quarterly. Calculated, compustat 
Capital expenditures Capital expenditures / total assets.  Measured quarterly. Calculated, compustat 
Advertising expense Advertising expense / total assets.  Measured quarterly. Calculated, compustat 
CEO and chairman Binary variable equal to one if the CEO is also Chairman of 
the Board of Directors, and zero if not.   
Brick, et al. (2006) 
CEO shareholding CEO ownership of firm stock as a percent of total firm 
equity. 
Brick, et al. (2006) 
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initial IPO returns is higher among firms with higher information asymmetry and, thus, whose value is 
more difficult for underwriters to estimate. 
 
Table 3: Firm and IPO characteristics of sample firms 
This table presents descriptive statistics of firm and IPO characteristics of SharesPost-listed and non-SharesPost-listed IPO firms.  
The sample period is 2009 to 2015.  Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.  The symbols **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 and levels, respectively. 
  SharesPost IPO firms Non-SharesPost IPO firms Difference   
  Mean Median N Mean Median N p-value   
         
First day return (%) 38.20 32.96 55 16.91 8.75 503 <.0001 *** 
21 day return (%) 32.68 25.03 55 20.20 14.38 503 0.018 ** 
IPO, shares offered (#, mm) 21.11 8.79 55 13.09 7.05 503 0.108  
IPO proceeds ($, mm) 521.27 150.00 55 243.88 100.00 503 0.001 *** 
Underwriting fee - gross spread 
(%) 6.65 7.00 55 6.66 7.00 486 0.170  
Underwriter rank (average) 8.70 8.75 55 7.76 8.40 503 <.0001 *** 
Total assets ($, mm) 386.00 139.49 55 2,035.47 114.07 503 0.635  
Cash flow (%) -11.10 -3.40 55 -9.07 1.30 503 0.228  
Firm age a/o IPO 8.58 8.00 55 22.18 11.00 503 0.001 *** 
Firm sales ($, mm) 85.39 43.20 55 272.43 25.85 469 0.045 ** 
Offer price revision (%) 11.22 11.11 55 -2.92 0.00 503 <.0001 *** 
                  
 
Thus, univariate tests and statistics demonstrate that most of the IPO characteristics of 
SharesPost-listed firms are greater than those of other IPO firms, while most firm characteristics are not 
significantly different than that of other firms.  Notably, the evidence highlights that SharesPost firms are 
younger, utilize higher prestige underwriters for the IPO and experience much higher underpricing, on 
average.   
We further examine the influence of a SharesPost listing on IPO returns by running time fixed-
effects regression analysis on a SharesPost indicator and control variables for firm and IPO 
characteristics, tested above, that have been shown in the literature to capture uncertainty about IPO 
returns.  We employ robust standard errors, clustered by time.  Table 5 presents the results of these 
regressions.   
Models 1 and 2 report results for 21 day initial IPO returns.  Both models report that a SharesPost 
listing has an insignificant effect on 21 day IPO initial returns.  The control variable average underwriter 
rank has a positive and significant effect on 21 day initial IPO return, consistent with Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) and Cliff and Denis (2004).  The size of the offering (log of shares offered) has a negative and 
significant effect on 21 day IPO return in Model 2, consistent with the model of Lowry, et al. (2010) in 
which smaller offerings are harder for underwriters to value (given the relative lack of information about 
smaller companies), leading to underpricing and high initial IPO returns.  Offer price revision has a 
positive and significant effect on 21 day initial IPO return, a finding consistent with Butler, et al. (2014) 
who find that offer price revision is a significant predictor of IPO returns.  The estimated coefficient for 
the ratio of total firm liabilities to assets is negative and significant, consistent with Butler, et al. (2014).  
The estimated coefficient for firm age is positive and significant in Model 2, a finding that is inconsistent 
with Lowry, et al. (2010).  The estimated coefficients for the remaining control variables are either weakly 
significant or not significant. 
Models 3 and 4 run the same specifications, but substitute first day IPO return in place of 21 day 
IPO return as the dependent variable.  The SharesPost indicator variable again has an insignificant effect 
on first day IPO return.  The results are largely similar to those reported in Models 1 and 2; the coefficients 
of the control variables generally retain the sign reported in Models 1 and 2, but with some differences  
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Table 4: Standard deviation of initial IPO returns  
This table presents the standard deviations of initial IPO returns of SharesPost-listed and non-SharesPost-listed IPO 
firms.  The sample period is 2009 to 2015.  First day IPO returns are defined as the percent difference between the 
close of trading price on the first day of trading and the offer price.  21 day IPO returns are defined as the percent 
difference between the close of trading price on the 21st day of trading and the offer price.  
  SharesPost IPO firms Non-SharesPost IPO firms 
  Standard Deviation N 
Standard 
Deviation 
N 
       
First day return (%)  36.07 55  28.43 503 
21 day return (%)  39.04 55  34.81 503 
               
in significance.  The coefficients for underwriter rank and the ratio of total liabilities to assets are either 
not significant, or weakly significant.  The coefficient for the dummy variable VC-backed is positive and 
significant, consistent with the findings of Lowry, et al. (2010).  The coefficient for prior month’s CRSP 
EW return is also positive and significant, an effect opposite of that found in Butler, et al. (2014).  Overall, 
these test results ae inconsistent with the hypothesis that trading in a firm’s shares on the SharesPost 
platform during the pre-IPO period significantly lessens information asymmetry and IPO underpricing. 
5.2  Regression analysis that addresses endogeneity of a SharesPost listing 
The results in the previous section indicate that listed firms on SharesPost are likely not randomly chosen.  
Characteristics reported in Table 3 reflect the composition of the IPO firms listed on SharesPost.  A 
review of these firms shows that they are predominately i) located in or around the San Francisco Bay 
area close to SharesPost’s headquarters in San Francisco, ii) young, iii) highly-visible and iv) tech firms.  
Prominent examples of SharesPost-listed firms include Twitter, Yelp, LinkedIn and Palo Alto Networks.   
Because highly-visible firms increase demand and trade volume for the SharesPost platform, these 
shares tend to be the ones offered for sale on SharesPost.  However, these firms also tend to be the ones 
that attract the most prestigious underwriters, who in turn trade-off higher underpricing for providing 
all-star analyst coverage, a competitive advantage increasingly sought by issuers (Loughran and Ritter, 
2004; Cliff and Denis, 2004).  In this way, highly-visible technology firms in the San Francisco Bay area 
who experience higher levels of underpricing are more likely to be listed on SharesPost.  Thus, using a 
SharesPost dummy variable to explain underpricing presents an endogeneity problem that may bias 
results in OLS regressions as SharesPost firms are not randomly chosen. 
To address the endogeneity problem we also report analysis using two-step instrumental variable 
(IV) regressions.  The first stage estimates SharesPost, an indicator variable that captures a listing on 
SharesPost, using a probit model that utilizes distance as an instrumental variable.  The second stage uses 
the predicted value from the first stage in our regressions of initial IPO returns.  Our asymmetrical 
information reduction hypothesis predicts that the coefficient of SHP is negative and significantly 
different from zero. 
Distance is measured as the number of miles between an IPO firm’s headquarters and the 
SharesPost headquarters in San Francisco using the latitude and longitude of each firm’s postal zip code.  
Because distance to the SharesPost headquarters is a highly significant determinant of a SharesPost listing 
(as shown subsequently in Table 6), the instrument used in the first stage regression is strong.  Further, 
as distance is not a significant determinant of initial IPO returns of the population of U.S. IPO firms the 
instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction.  Finally, the model is identified because we have one 
instrument, distance, that is not included in the second stage regression but is used to predict the 
endogenous variable SharesPost in the first stage regression. 
The results of the first stage of the two-step analysis are reported in Table 6.  In the analysis, the 
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of one if the IPO firm is listed on 
SharesPost prior to the IPO and a value of zero if it is not.  The results indicate that distance to the  
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Table 5: Regression of IPO returns on explanatory variables 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of two measures of IPO returns on explanatory variables for the 
pooled sample of SharesPost-listed and non-SharesPost-listed firms.  The sample period is 2009 to 2015. 21 day IPO 
returns are defined as the percent difference between the close of trading price on the 21st day of trading and the offer 
price.  First day IPO returns are defined as the percent difference between the close of trading price on the first day of 
trading and the offer price.  Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.  T-stats, adjusted for clustering at the time level, 
are reported in parentheses.  The symbols*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 and levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables   21 day return 21 day return First day return First day return 
           
SharesPost indicator  -0.05  -0.01  0.06  0.06  
   (0.82)  (0.19)  (1.18)  (1.03)  
Underwriter rank (average)  0.03 
*** 0.03 *** 0.01  0.01  
   (2.36) 
 
(2.65)  (1.45)  (0.95)  
IPO, # of shares (log)  -0.02 
 
-0.04 ** -0.03 ** -0.05 *** 
   (0.99) 
 
(1.99)  (2.14)  (3.04)  
Offer price revision  0.01 
*** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 
   (9.05) 
 
(9.36)  (11.08)  (10.53)  
Tech industry indicator  0.01 
 
0.01  -0.03  -0.03  
   (0.27) 
 
(0.29)  (1.30)  (1.22)  
VC - backed indicator  0.07 
* 0.06  0.07 ** 0.08 *** 
   (2.08) 
 
(1.51)  (2.32)  (2.73)  
Exchange indicator  0.05 
 
0.03  0.03  0.03  
   (1.57) 
 
(0.84)  (1.38)  (0.99)  
Previous month's IPO return 0.03 
 
-0.23  -0.08  -0.17  
   (0.19) 
 
(1.23)  (0.51)  (1.03)  
CRSP EW return  4.02 
 
10.35  22.25 *** 20.65 *** 
   (0.46) 
 
(1.20)  (3.45)  (3.06)  
CRSP EW st. dev.  2.98 
 
1.41  0.38  3.60  
   (0.64) 
 
(0.34)  (0.12)  (1.04)  
Total liabilities to assets  -0.04 
*** -0.06 *** -0.03 ** -0.02  
   (3.03) 
 
(3.93)  (2.19)  (1.46)  
Firm age a/o IPO date (log) 0.00 
 
0.03 ** 0.01  0.01  
   (0.12) 
 
(2.03)  (0.57)  (0.85)  
Firm cash flow  0.02 
 
0.11  0.03  0.02  
   (0.24) 
 
(1.29)  (0.63)  (0.33)  
Firm sales (log)   
 
-0.01    0.01  
    
 
(1.00)    (1.30)  
    
 
      
Constant   0.11  0.50  0.43 ** 0.76 *** 
   (0.34)  (1.60)  (2.01)  (2.83)  
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared   0.23  0.26  0.30  0.33  
Observations   558   453   558   453   
 
SharesPost headquarters is a highly significant predictor of a SharesPost listing, with the likelihood of a 
listing decreasing the further away the firm is located.  The results also indicate that being a technology 
firm is a significant predictor of a SharesPost listing, as is the size of the firm.  Thus, San Francisco Bay 
area technology firms with high revenue are most likely to list on the exchange. 
The results of the second stage regression of the two-step analysis are reported in Table 7.  We 
again employ robust standard errors, clustered by time.  Models 1 and 2 report results for the 21 day 
initial IPO return, Models 3 and 4 for the first day IPO return.  For the 21 day return in the first two 
columns, the estimated coefficient for SharesPost, the predicted value of a SharesPost listing from the 
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model reported in Table 6, is negative but not statistically significant.  The estimated coefficient for the 
predicted SharesPost variable is positive but, again, is not statistically significant in the regressions for 
first day return in Models 3 and 4.  These results are similar to the results from OLS regressions reported 
in Table 5.  Generally consistent with the results from the OLS regressions - underwriter rank, offer price 
revision, CRSP EW return and the dummy variable VC-backed remain significant drivers of IPO returns.  
Thus, the results for the SharesPost variable do not support our asymmetrical information reduction 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 6: First stage probit regression analysis of a SharesPost listing 
This table presents the results from a probit regression analysis of a SharesPost listing.  The sample period is 2009 to 
2015.  The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the IPO firm is listed on the SharesPost platform during 
the pre-IPO period and equals zero if the IPO firm is not listed on the SharesPost platform.  Explanatory variables are 
defined in Table 1.  The Wald chi-square statistics of the regression coefficients are reported in parentheses.  The symbol 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
Dependent variable    SharesPost   
Explanatory variables    indicator   
     
Distance   -0.0004 
*** 
   (23.67) 
 
Tech industry indicator  0.59 
*** 
   (10.06) 
 
Firm sales (log)  0.13 
*** 
   (7.55) 
 
    
 
Constant   -1.49 *** 
   (31.62)  
Log likelihood  -142.23  
χ2   37.03  
Observations   446   
 
5.3  Two-stage IV regression analysis of matched sample of technology firms 
Although the set of control variables utilized in the preceding regressions are robust, it may be that they 
do not adequately control for the firm characteristics of SharesPost-listed firms.  To examine the 
sensitivity of our findings to this possibility, we form a control group of like firms that have not listed on 
SharesPost by matching on industry, as measured by firm’s three-digit SIC code.   We restrict the non-
SharesPost control firms in the subsequent regressions to be only high-tech as defined as belonging to 
the biotech, computer equipment, communications, electronics and general technology industries (SIC 
codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 382, 384, 481, 482, 489, 737, 873).  We utilize the same two-step approach and 
specification as used in Section 5.2. 
The results of the first stage of the two-step analysis are reported in Table 8.  For purposes of this 
regression, we substitute an exchange indicator variable in place of the technology indicator used in the 
previous regressions.  Reported results indicate that the first stage remains strong.  The results of the 
second stage of the two-step analysis are reported in Table 9.  In all four models, the predicted value of 
the SharesPost variable is insignificant.  These results, overall, are similar to the results from the OLS and 
two-step regressions reported in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, however the magnitudes of the control variables 
are generally smaller, reflecting the reduced sample size.  Offer price revision, CRSP EW return and firm 
age are significant drivers of first day IPO returns for the technology firms tested, while offer price 
revision is a significant driver of 21 day initial IPO returns.  These results do not support the hypothesis 
that a SharesPost listing significantly lessens information asymmetry and IPO underpricing. 
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Table 7: Second stage treatment regression of IPO returns  
This table presents the results from two-step treatment regressions using an instrumental variable approach to control for 
endogeneity.  The sample period is 2009 to 2015.  21 day IPO returns are defined as the percent difference between the 
close of trading price on the 21st day of trading and the offer price.  First day IPO returns are defined as the percent 
difference between the close of trading price on the first day of trading and the offer price.  Predicted SharesPost indicator 
is the predicted value from the first stage of the probability of a pre-IPO listing on SharesPost.  Remaining explanatory 
variables are defined in Table 1.  T-stats, adjusted for clustering at the time level, are reported in parentheses.  The symbols 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 and levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables   21 day return 21 day return First day return First day return 
           
Predicted SharesPost indicator -0.06 -0.001  0.10  0.04  
   (0.30) 
 
(0.00)  (0.62)  (0.26)  
Underwriter rank (average)  0.02 
** 0.03 ** 0.01  0.01  
   (2.32) 
 
(2.45)  (1.26)  (1.00)  
IPO, # of shares (log)  -0.05 
*** -0.04 * -0.04 *** -0.05 *** 
   (2.62) 
 
(1.92)  (2.80)  (3.08)  
Offer price revision  0.01 
*** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 
   (9.69) 
 
(9.63)  (11.01)  (11.03)  
Tech industry indicator  0.02 
 
0.01  -0.05  -0.04  
   (0.49) 
 
(0.20)  (1.59)  (1.22)  
VC - backed indicator  0.06 
 
0.05  0.07 ** 0.08 ** 
   (1.58) 
 
(1.34)  (2.33)  (2.52)  
Exchange indicator  0.03 
 
0.03  0.03  0.03  
   (0.96) 
 
(0.79)  (0.99)  (1.12)  
Previous month's IPO return -0.22 
 
-0.23  -0.22  -0.21  
   (1.16) 
 
(1.21)  (1.32)  (1.28)  
CRSP EW return  9.53 
 
10.10  20.97 *** 20.46 *** 
   (1.12) 
 
(1.16)  (3.09)  (3.03)  
CRSP EW st. dev.  1.41 
 
1.37  4.36  4.40  
   (0.35) 
 
(0.34)  (1.32)  (1.33)  
Total liabilities to assets  -0.05 
*** -0.06 *** -0.02  -0.02  
   (3.75) 
 
(3.85)  (1.33)  (1.25)  
Firm age a/o IPO date (log) 0.03 ** 0.03 * 0.01  0.01  
   (1.81) 
 
(1.90)  (1.21)  (0.70)  
Firm cash flow  0.08 
 
0.11  0.04  0.01  
   (0.94) 
 
(1.27)  (0.64)  (0.15)  
Firm sales (log)   
 
-0.01    0.01  
    
 
(0.96)    (1.35)  
    
 
      
Constant   0.66 ** 0.51  0.56 ** 0.70 *** 
   (2.27) 
 
(1.56)  (2.38)  (2.66)  
Time fixed effects  Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared   0.26  0.26  0.34  0.34  
Observations   446   446   446   446   
 
5.4  Matched sample analysis of IPO returns  
As a robustness test, we next examine the influence of a SharesPost listing on IPO returns by performing 
a more rigorous matched sample analysis.  It may be that controlling only for industry risk, as we do in 
the previous section, does not adequately mitigate heterogeneity in firm and industry characteristics.  To 
do so, we form the control group by selecting from the population of non-SharesPost IPO firms those 
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firms that match the treatment group (SharesPost firms) along five dimensions: IPO date, venture capital 
funding, industry, total assets and firm age.  We match firms, without replacement, using the following  
five criteria:  the control firm 1) has at least one round of venture capital funding, 2) went public during 
the sample period 2000 to 2015, 3) competes in the same industry as the matched SharesPost firm, as 
measured by firm’s three-digit SIC code, 4) has total assets greater than 75%, but less than 125%, of the 
matched SharesPost firm, and 5) is older than 75%, but younger than 125%, of the age of the matched 
SharesPost firm, as of date of the IPO.  By matching along these dimensions we are able to effectively 
control for risk along lines of business, regimes of hot/cold IPO markets, and idiosyncratic risk.  Applying 
these data restrictions reduces the initial sample of SharesPost firms from 62 to 34 firms, which are 
matched to 34 control firms19; hence, the total sample size used for the analysis that follows is 68 firms. 
 
Table 8: First stage probit regression analysis of a SharesPost listing for matched sample 
This table presents the results from a probit regression analysis of a SharesPost listing for technology firms.  The sample 
period is 2009 to 2015.  The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the IPO firm is listed on the SharesPost 
platform during the pre-IPO period and equals zero if the IPO firm is not listed on the SharesPost platform.  Explanatory 
variables are defined in Table 1.  The Wald chi-square statistics of the regression coefficients are reported in parentheses.  
The symbols **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 and levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable    SharesPost   
Explanatory variables    indicator   
    
 
Distance   -0.0004 *** 
   (16.82)  
Exchange indicator  0.31  
   (2.01)  
Firm sales (log)  0.17 ** 
   (5.07)  
     
Constant   -0.82 ** 
   (5.75)  
Log likelihood  -95.82 
χ2   19.74 
 
Observations   172   
 
Table 10 reports the results of univariate tests of IPO returns and the variables used to explain 
IPO returns.  IPO returns for SharesPost firms are statistically indistinguishable from that of control 
firms, on average, for both first day and 21 day IPO returns.  Fees paid by SharesPost firms to 
underwriters, as well as the average prestige rank of the underwriters, are also virtually identical to that of 
control firms.   However, SharesPost firms have significantly larger IPO offerings, as measured by the 
number of shares offered in the IPO and IPO proceeds.  Most measures of firm size - total assets, firm 
sales and firm age - are statistically indistinguishable, however, SharesPost firms have significantly lower 
cash flow than control firms.   Overall, the firm and IPO characteristics of the SharesPost and control 
groups are statistically similar, with the exception of the level of cash flow and size of the IPO offerings. 
Table 11 presents the results of OLS regression analysis. We again examine the influence of a 
SharesPost listing on IPO returns by regressing IPO returns on a SharesPost indicator and the same set 
of control variables for firm and IPO characteristics utilized in tests in the previous sections.  We again 
employ clustered robust standard errors, clustered by time.   
  
 
                                                 
19 The distribution of IPO dates for the sample of control firms is [year (firms)]: 2015-2009 (22), 2008 (1), 2007 (7), 2005 (1), 2004 (1), 
2000 (2). 
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Table 9: Second stage treatment regression of IPO returns for technology firms 
This table presents the results from two-step treatment regressions using an instrumental variable approach to control for 
endogeneity.  The sample period is 2009 to 2015.  21 day IPO returns are defined as the percent difference between the 
close of trading price on the 21st day of trading and the offer price.  First day IPO returns are defined as the percent 
difference between the close of trading price on the first day of trading and the offer price.  Predicted SharesPost indicator 
is the predicted value from the first stage in Table 8 of the probability of a pre-IPO listing on SharesPost for technology 
firms.  Remaining explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.  T-stats, adjusted for clustering at the time level, are reported 
in parentheses.  The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 and levels, respectively. 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable   21 day return 21 day return First day return First day return 
Explanatory variables   Second Stage Second Stage Second Stage Second Stage 
           
SharesPost indicator  -0.03  0.07  -0.04  -0.02  
   (0.13)  (0.33)  (0.28)  (0.15)  
Underwriter rank (average)  0.06  0.08 * 0.05  0.05  
   (1.48)  (1.77)  (1.48)  (1.49)  
IPO, # of shares (log)  -0.02  0.01  -0.01  0.00  
   (0.62)  (0.25)  (0.40)  (0.08)  
Offer price revision  0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 
   (3.98)  (3.90)  (5.72)  (5.67)  
Tech industry indicator  0.03  0.01  -0.06  -0.07  
   (0.53)  (0.15)  (1.30)  (1.35)  
VC - backed indicator  0.00  -0.02  0.04  0.03  
   (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.61)  (0.51)  
Exchange indicator  -0.01  -0.03  0.00  0.00  
   (0.24)  (0.58)  (0.07)  (0.02)  
Previous month's IPO return 0.21  0.19  0.33  0.33  
   (0.51)  (0.50)  (1.25)  (1.23)  
CRSP EW return  12.15  14.18  21.99 ** 22.46 ** 
   (0.86)  (1.00)  (2.02)  (2.03)  
CRSP EW st. dev.  -7.61  1.00  -2.21  -2.15  
   (1.13)  (1.11)  (0.39)  (0.38)  
Total liabilities to assets  -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  
   (0.64)  (0.51)  (0.38)  (0.35)  
Firm age a/o IPO date (log) -0.08  -0.07  -0.09 ** -0.09 ** 
   (1.56)  (1.40)  (2.31)  (2.25)  
Firm cash flow  0.03  0.12  -0.02  0.01  
   (0.21)  (0.87)  (0.10)  (0.04)  
Firm sales (log)    -0.04    -0.01  
     (1.23)    (0.39)  
           
Constant   0.25  -0.40  0.08  -0.07  
   (0.41)  (0.48)  (0.16)  (0.10)  
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared   0.20  0.21  0.31  0.31  
Observations   172   172   172   172   
 
Model 1 reports that a SharesPost listing has an insignificant effect on 21 day IPO return.  Average 
rank of the underwriters in the syndicate has a positive and significant effect, while previous month’s 
IPO return has a negative and significant effect.  The remaining control variables have an insignificant 
effect on 21 day IPO return.  Models 2 and 3 use the specifications from previous tests; again the 
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SharesPost dummy has an insignificant effect on 21 day IPO return.20  The lack of statistically significant 
results for the controls is likely due to the lack of variability within each variable (as reported in Table 10) 
produced by matching the treatment and control firms on 5 dimensions. 
  
Table 10: Firm and IPO characteristics of matched sample firms 
This table presents descriptive statistics of firm and IPO characteristics of a matched sample of SharesPost-listed and non-
SharesPost-listed firms.  The sample period is 2000 to 2015. Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.  The symbols *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 and levels, respectively. 
  SharesPost IPO firms Control IPO firms Difference   
  Mean Median N Mean Median N p-value   
         
First day return (%) 33.69 29.95 34 39.35 31.86 34 0.917  
21 day return (%) 32.76 31.51 34 44.86 31.16 34 0.883  
IPO, shares offered (#, mm) 12.86 7.54 34 5.16 5.88 34 0.010 *** 
IPO proceeds ($, mm) 212.28 121.30 34 97.14 100.40 34 0.017 ** 
Underwriting fee - gross spread 
(%) 6.78 7.00 34 6.77 7.00 34 0.273  
Underwriter rank (average) 8.67 8.75 34 8.63 8.79 34 0.390  
Total assets ($, mm) 212.68 120.15 34 295.47 105.55 34 0.783  
Cash flow (%) -10.21 -2.95 34 -0.28 1.71 34 0.094 * 
Firm age a/o IPO 9.32 8.00 34 9.46 9.00 34 0.844  
Firm sales ($, mm) 55.21 30.37 34 62.32 42.29 34 0.908  
                  
 
Models 4, 5 and 6 use similar specifications but substitute first day IPO return in place of 21 day 
IPO return as the dependent variable.  Results are largely similar.  The SharesPost indicator variable again 
has an insignificant effect on first day IPO return while offer price revision has a positive and significant 
effect and the tech industry dummy has a negative and significant effect.  Overall, these test results are 
again inconsistent with the hypothesis that trading in a firm’s shares on the SharesPost platform during 
the pre-IPO period significantly lessens information asymmetry and IPO underpricing. 
In summary, the results of analyses presented in Section 5 indicate that pre-IPO trading in a firm’s 
shares on the SharesPost platform does not significantly lessen information asymmetry, nor IPO 
underpricing.  SharesPost-listed IPO firms tend to be highly-visible technology firms who receive much 
press and investor attention and publicity.  Because SharesPost does not publicly release trading data, nor 
require the release of firm financial data, and many listing firms are reluctant to release additional private 
information to new owners, potential reductions in existing information asymmetries appear to be limited 
to market data privately available to participants.  Analysis in this paper shows that the additional 
information provided by private trading in the shares on SharesPost provides little additional information 
to significantly attenuate uncertainty during the IPO process.   
 
6.  The benefits of a SharesPost listing  
6.1  Executive compensation 
The sample we have compiled for this study also provides an excellent opportunity to examine a 
purported benefit of the private secondary market: liquidity provision to firm employees.  If the  
                                                 
20 The matched sample used for the regressions in Table 10 creates a high degree of collinearity in the variable IPO, # of shares (log) – a 
VIF test in SAS produces a VIF coefficient of around 10.  We exclude the coefficient for this reason in Models 2 and 5, but include it in 
the full specifications in Models 3 and 6 in the interest of full disclosure to test the previous specifications. 
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Table 11: Regression of IPO returns on explanatory variables 
This table presents the results from OLS regressions of two measures of IPO returns on explanatory variables for the pooled sample of SharesPost-listed and non-SharesPost-
listed control firms.  The sample period is 2000 to 2015. Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.  T-stats, adjusted for clustering at the time level, are reported in 
parentheses.  The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 and levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Explanatory variables   21 day return 21 day return 21 day return First day return First day return First day return 
               
SharesPost indicator  -0.07  -0.04  -0.06  0.02  0.03  0.05  
   (0.66)  (0.33)  (0.52)  (0.29)  (0.35)  (0.52)  
Underwriter rank (average)  0.55 ** 0.56 ** 0.57 ** -0.03  0.04  0.03  
   (2.14)  (2.43)  (2.41)  (0.32)  (0.38)  (0.28)  
IPO, # of shares (log)      0.02      0.00  
       (0.89)      (0.01)  
Offer price revision  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 *** 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 
   (0.70)  (0.95)  (0.78)  (2.90)  (2.62)  (2.49)  
Tech industry indicator    -0.26  -0.25    -0.31 ** -0.31 ** 
     (1.46)  (1.29)    (2.39)  (2.29)  
VC - backed indicator  -0.01  -0.04  -0.02  -0.07  -0.04  -0.05  
   (0.10)  (0.32)  (0.11)  (0.51)  (0.26)  (0.31)  
Exchange indicator    0.07  0.08    0.03  0.00  
     (0.65)  (0.68)    (0.28)  (0.00)  
Previous month's IPO return -1.23 * -1.05  -0.94  -0.21  0.15  0.29  
   (1.75)  (1.35)  (1.12)  (0.33)  (0.21)  (0.39)  
CRSP EW return    11.72  20.00    60.59  66.11  
     (0.22)  (0.35)    (1.34)  (1.35)  
CRSP EW st. dev.    28.46  29.98    7.89  9.53  
     (1.27)  (1.29)    (0.39)  (0.46)  
Total liabilities to assets  -0.12  -0.11  -0.12  0.22  0.26  0.29  
   (0.55)  (0.51)  (0.53)  (1.08)  (1.35)  (1.43)  
Firm age a/o IPO date (log) -0.23  -0.23  -0.22  -0.21  -0.28 * -0.27 * 
   (1.11)  (1.00)  (0.93)  (1.37)  (1.85)  (1.96)  
Firm cash flow  -0.63  -0.49  -0.42  0.41  0.51  0.63  
   (1.21)  (0.93)  (0.76)  (1.02)  (1.10)  (1.29)  
Firm sales (log)      -0.02      0.05  
       (0.29)      (1.34)  
               
Constant   -0.41  -0.65  -0.83  1.84 ** 1.61 * 1.76 ** 
   (0.20)  (0.31)  (0.38)  (2.27)  (1.88)  (2.05)  
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared   0.70  0.72  0.72  0.38  0.44  0.45  
Observations   68   68   68   68   68   68   
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lengthening of the start-up cycle increases liquidity risk then private secondary marketplaces like 
SharesPost that provide liquidity in the pre-IPO market should decrease liquidity risk.  We hypothesize 
that companies that list on SharesPost will be able to offer their executives more stock-based 
compensation and that employees will sell less shares during the IPO, due to the pre-IPO liquidity 
provided by SharesPost. 
In this section we examine the effect of a SharesPost listing on liquidity provision to firm 
executives and founders.  Because compensation varies considerably by industry and firm risk levels, 
we utilize matched sample analysis to ensure the sample is comprised of like firms.  We again examine 
the matched sample used in the foregoing analysis presented in section 5.4.  To normalize variables, all 
variables are winsorized at the 10% and 90% level.     
To test the impact of a SharesPost listing on firm compensation, we hand collect data on the 
annual compensation of “named executive officers” provided in the Executive Compensation section 
of firm S-1 registration statements.  The data outlines the total compensation owed to the named 
executive officers in the years preceding IPO.  For purposes of this analysis, we utilize compensation 
data for the year preceding IPO, as data for the two years preceding IPO is available in only about half 
of our sample firms.  The data also outlines the form and timing of the compensation.  We rely on the 
estimate of U.S. dollar value provided by the firms in the S-1 statements for stock grants and stock 
options.21   
There are an average of 5 named executives listed in the S-1 statements of the firms that make 
up our sample.  Compensation amounts vary considerably: the mean (median) annual compensation 
for an executive is $1.2 ($0.7) million, with a high of $3.3 million and a low of $1.3 million.  Table 12 
reports descriptive statistics about the proportion of annual employee compensation paid in stock vs. 
non-stock, as well as tests of differences.  Firms that list on the SharesPost platform pay 54% of total 
employee compensation in stock and stock option in the year before IPO, on average, as measured by 
the variable % Stock compensation.  This percentage is significantly higher than the 35% average for 
firms that do not list on SharesPost.  As expected, the complementary measure, % Non-stock 
compensation, has the opposite result; firms that do not list on SharesPost pay 65% of total employee 
compensation in non-stock, a significantly larger percentage than the 46% paid by SharesPost firms.  
This finding supports the hypothesis that firms listed on SharesPost are able to pay their employees in 
stock and stock options, in the year before going public, to a greater extent than non-SharesPost 
companies, given the liquidity that the SharesPost platform provides. 
We next use regression analysis to further examine the influence of a SharesPost listing on the 
percentage of employee annual compensation paid in stock prior to the IPO.  Because the possible 
values of the dependent variable (percentage of employee annual compensation paid in stock) are 
bounded by zero and one, we treat the variable as a censored continuous variable.  As such, we employ 
a two-limit Tobit model with a lower bound of zero and upper bound of one.22  We again include 
variables to control for firm, industry and financing characteristics; for this analysis we also add control 
variables shown to determine the level and structure of executive compensation.  Because the literature 
on compensation finds a positive relationship between firm complexity and compensation (e.g., Core 
et al., 1999; Murphy, 1999 and Brick et al., 2006), we include control variables, such as size, leverage, 
cash flow and intangible assets, that proxy for firm complexity and risk.  Executive compensation may 
also be related to the governance structure of the firm, hence, we include control variables used in the 
literature to proxy for firm governance.  We again use an indicator variable to capture a SharesPost 
listing.   
                                                 
21 All firms in the sample valued stock grants and stock options awarded to executive officers as the fair value as of grant date, valued 
using either a Black Scholes or Binomial framework. 
22 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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Table 12: Executive and director compensation and shareholdings   
This table presents descriptive statistics for forms of executive compensation and shareholdings offered in IPOs for 
SharesPost-listed and non-SharesPost-listed control firms.  The sample period is 2000 to 2015.  Percent stock compensation 
is the percentage of executive employee annual compensation paid in stock and stock options in the year before IPO.  Percent 
non-stock compensation is the percentage of executive employee annual compensation paid in non-stock and non-stock 
options in the year before IPO.  Percent shares offered in the IPO is the percentage of total shares owned by executives and 
directors (prior to offering) sold in the IPO.  The symbol *** indicates significance at the .01 level. 
  N Mean   Median   Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
         
Panel A: SharesPost IPO firms         
         
Stock Compensation (%)  34 53.90  56.60  28.38 0.00 87.54 
Non - Stock Compensation (%)  34 46.10  43.40  28.38 12.46 100.00 
Shares offered in IPO (%) 34 0.75  0.00  1.37 0.00 4.47          
Panel B: Control IPO firms                  
Stock Compensation (%)  34 34.72  26.95  31.88 0.00 87.54 
Non - Stock Compensation (%)  34 65.28  73.05  31.88 12.46 100.00 
Shares offered in IPO (%) 34 1.13  0.08  1.67 0.00 4.47          
Panel C: Differences                  
Stock Compensation (%)   0.009 *** 0.002 ***    
Non - Stock Compensation (%)   0.009 *** 0.002 ***    
Shares offered in IPO (%)  0.195  0.468     
          
Model 1 of Table 13 reports that the estimated coefficient for the variable of interest, the 
SharesPost indicator, is positive and significant.  The technology industry indicator variable and size 
variable, total assets, are also positive and significant.  Models 2 and 3 add control variables for 
compensation, firm, industry and financing characteristics; in both models the SharesPost and 
technology industry indicator variables again have a positive and significant effect on % Stock 
compensation.  Model 4 adds the governance control variables, CEO & Chairman and CEO 
shareholding; results are qualitatively unchanged.  In these models, the total assets variable again has a 
positive and significant effect on % Stock compensation, while the firm sales variable has a negative 
and significant effect.  The results for the technology industry variable are consistent with existing 
evidence that technology firms pay more in stock than cash; the result for the sales variable is consistent 
with existing evidence that firms with greater cash flow pay more in cash compensation.  Thus, test 
results reported in Table 13 provide additional support for the hypothesis that a SharesPost listing 
significantly influences the form of compensation paid to employees before IPO.       
6.2  Stakeholder participation in IPO 
As a second test of the hypothesis that listing on SharesPost allows firms to reward employees more 
with stock and stock options than comparable non-SharesPost firms, we examine the level of 
stockholdings offered by firm officers and directors during the IPO.  The IPO process is often regarded 
as a means for firm founders, officers and other stakeholders to “cash out” of their holdings of firm 
stock.  If SharesPost provides liquidity pre-IPO, then those stakeholders should offer a smaller 
percentage of their holdings of firm stock in the IPO than officers in non-SharesPost firms, all else 
equal.   
To test the impact of a SharesPost listing on compensation liquidity, we hand collect data on 
stakeholder stock ownership from the Principal and Selling Stockholder section of firm S-1 registration 
statements.  The section provides data on the number of shares owned prior to the IPO, and 
subsequently offered in the IPO, by named officers, directors and stockholders.  For purposes of this 
analysis, we utilize data on the stock ownership of named officers and directors. 
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Table 13: Regression of stock compensation on explanatory variables 
This table presents the results from Tobit regressions of the percent of firm officer’s compensation paid in stock and stock 
options on explanatory variables for the pooled sample of SharesPost-listed and non-SharesPost-listed control firms.  
Regressions utilize a two-limit Tobit model with a lower bound of zero and upper bound of one.  The sample period is 2000 
to 2015. Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.  The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 and levels, respectively. 
Stock Compensation (%)           
Explanatory Variables   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                      SharesPost indicator  0.14 * 0.15 * 0.14 * 0.14 * 
   (1.68)  (1.80)  (1.70)  (1.68)  
Tech industry indicator  0.33 ** 0.38 *** 0.38 *** 0.38 *** 
   (2.49)  (2.93)  (2.92)  (2.89)  
Firm cash flow    0.01  0.03  0.02  
     (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.11)  
Firm total assets (log)  0.13 ** 0.24 ** 0.25 *** 0.25 *** 
   (2.47)  (2.52)  (2.63)  (2.63)  
Firm sales (log)    -0.16 * -0.18 * -0.18 * 
     (1.75)  (1.88)  (1.81)  
Firm age a/o IPO date     0.00  0.00  0.00  
     (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.05)  
Number of venture financing rounds   0.01  0.00  0.00  
     (0.34)  (0.25)  (0.25)  
Advertising expense      0.80  0.79  
       (0.74)  (0.73)  
Firm debt     0.47  0.44  0.44  
     (1.51)  (1.38)  (1.32)  
Capital expenditures    -0.65  -0.61  -0.62  
     (0.86)  (0.80)  (0.78)  
Intangible assets    -0.07  -0.09  -0.10  
     (0.29)  (0.38)  (0.38)  
CEO and chairman        0.00  
         (0.06)  
CEO shareholding        0.04  
         (0.06)  
           
Constant   -0.72 ** -0.42  -0.44  -0.45  
   (2.23)  (0.95)  (0.99)  (0.99)  
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Log likelihood  
-
20.60  -16.95  -16.68  -16.67  
Observations   68   68   68   68   
 
The median market value of IPOs in our sample is $105 million, comparable to the median 
value of U.S. IPOs over the same period, $108 million.23  There are an average of 12 named executives 
and directors who own stock in their firms prior to the IPO; they sell shares in 32 of the 68 IPOs tested 
in this section. Table 12 reports descriptive statistics about the proportion of officer and director stock 
offered for sale in the IPO.  Officers and directors in SharesPost-listed firms offer a smaller percentage 
of their stock holdings in the IPO (mean of 0.75% and median of 0.00%) as compared to control firms 
(mean of 1.13% and median of 0.08%), although the difference is not statistically significant. 
Table 14 reports the test results of the effect of a SharesPost listing on the percent of officers’ 
and directors’ stock holding offered as part of the firm IPO.  We include in the regressions the same 
                                                 
23 2017 IPO Report, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, May 25, 2017. 
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firm, industry, financing and compensation control variables from the previous tests; we again utilize a 
Tobit model with a lower bound of zero and upper bound of one.  Because the literature documents 
periods of very high initial returns in the IPO market (see, e.g., Ibbotson, et al., 1988 and 1994; Lowry, 
et al., 2010) we also include an indicator variable to control for these “hot” IPO markets.  Hot IPO 
markets may induce executive officers to forego liquidating a portion of their equity holdings via 
SharesPost to capture the excess returns available in the IPO market during these times.  The variable 
hot IPO takes on a value of 1 if the IPO is during the years 2004 to 2007, 0 otherwise.   
 
Table 14: Regression of executive officer’s shares offered in IPO on explanatory variables 
This table presents the results from Tobit regressions of the percent of firm officer’s shares offered in the IPO on 
explanatory variables for the pooled sample of SharesPost-listed and non-SharesPost-listed control firms.  Regressions 
utilize a two-limit Tobit model with a lower bound of zero and upper bound of one.  The sample period is 2000 to 2015. 
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 1.  The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 and levels, respectively. 
Shares offered in IPO (%)           
Explanatory Variables   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                      SharesPost indicator  -0.01 ** -0.01 * -0.01 * -0.01 * 
   (1.97)  (1.73)  (1.67)  (1.66)  
Tech industry indicator  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  
   (0.80)  (1.01)  (1.05)  (1.02)  
Hot IPO indicator    -0.03  -0.03  -0.03  
     (1.57)  (1.42)  (1.39)  
Firm cash flow    0.02  0.03  0.02  
     (1.09)  (1.58)  (1.28)  
Firm total assets (log)    0.00  0.00  0.00  
     (0.23)  (0.56)  (0.15)  
Firm sales (log)    0.00  -0.01  0.00  
     (0.47)  (0.92)  (0.69)  
Firm age a/o IPO date     0.00  0.00  0.00  
     (0.66)  (1.35)  (1.12)  
Number of venture financing rounds   -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 * 
     (1.48)  (1.62)  (1.72)  
Firm debt       0.06 *** 0.06 ** 
       (2.92)  (2.43)  
Intangible assets        0.013  
         (0.68)  
           
Constant   0.02  0.06 * 0.05  0.05 * 
   (1.39)  (1.73)  (1.63)  (1.70)  
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Log likelihood  57.65  61.65  65.76  65.99  
Observations   68   68   68   68   
 
Model 1 reports that the estimated coefficient for the SharesPost indicator variable is negative 
and significant; the estimated coefficient for the Technology industry dummy is not significant.  Models 
2, 3 and 4 add firm, industry financing and compensation control variables.  In each model the 
SharesPost indicator has a negative and significant effect on the Percent of officer shares offered in the 
IPO.  Firm debt has a positive and significant estimated coefficient while the variable Number of 
venture financing rounds has a negative and significant estimated coefficient.  Thus, test results reported 
in Table 14 provide support for the hypothesis that a SharesPost listing provides significant liquidity to 
employees before an IPO; firm officers and directors are not as reliant on an IPO for liquidity as officers 
and directors in firms who do not have access to SharesPost.   
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The analyses presented in this section indicates that the SharesPost platform provides some 
level of liquidity to the stakeholders of SharesPost-listed private firms during the pre-IPO period.  Test 
results show that SharesPost-listed private firms are able to pay their employees less in cash and more 
in stock and stock options than non-SharesPost companies.   Test results also show that founders, 
officers and directors in SharesPost-listed private firms sell less shares during the IPO, suggesting that 
liquidity provision via the SharesPost platform reduces the amount of capital raised in a funding event 
that must be allocated to meet employee needs.   
  
7.  Summary and conclusion 
The U.S. private securities secondary market is growing in both size and importance.  The market has 
evolved over the past thirty years to become a viable source of liquidity for private equity investors, 
accredited individual investors, private firm employees and others interested in investing in, or exiting, 
private firm investments.  The SharesPost private securities exchange platform is a prominent 
intermediary in the private secondary market that may potentially benefit private firms and their 
employees by providing increased liquidity and price formation during the pre-IPO stage of company 
growth.  Yet, relatively little academic research focuses on the effects of trading in the U.S. private 
securities markets.    
In this study, we test several hypotheses about private companies that list on the SharesPost 
exchange.  First, we test whether pre-IPO trading in an IPO firm’s shares on the SharesPost platform 
lessens information asymmetry and subsequent IPO underpricing.  While we find evidence to indicate 
that firm characteristics of the average IPO firm listed on SharesPost are significantly different than 
those of the average IPO firm, when we control for these factors in subsequent tests we find no 
evidence that a pre-IPO listing on SharesPost lessens IPO underpricing.  We highlight this as fruitful 
area for future research as the growth of the secondary market provides more data for empirical testing. 
We also find that SharesPost-listed private firms are able to pay their employees less in cash and 
more in stock and stock options than non-SharesPost companies.  Further, we find that founders and 
executives in SharesPost-listed private firms sell less shares during the IPO.  These results are robust to 
industry, firm, compensation and financing characteristics.  These findings suggest that liquidity 
provision via the SharesPost platform significantly influences the form of compensation paid to 
employees before IPO and reduces the amount of capital raised in a funding event such as a public 
offering that must be allocated to meet employee needs rather than fund company growth.   
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